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Abstract: The major contributors to therapeutic
innovations in the 20th century have been the
pharmaceutical companies, with biotechnology
companies adding significantly over the last twenty-five
years. However, these models increasingly have failed 
in translating the advances of biomedical sciences into
innovative products. We suggest a modern-day paradigm
for efficiently advancing new therapeutic products. This
"distributed partnering" approach would involve four
distinct, independent organizations to collaborate in a
risk-adjusted manner to discover, define, develop, and
deliver innovative products.
The new model would feature the formation of
companies called product definition companies (PDC),
which would focus solely on advancing innovation
through the initial definition research phase. PDCs would
consist of a team of experienced professionals who would
raise funds to manage several projects simultaneously.
PDCs would acquire early stage discoveries from research
institutions and invest in defining product applications
with a goal of selling the successful ones to
pharmaceutical companies for further development 
and delivery.
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The Fully Integrated
Pharmaceutical Co.
(Pharma) Model
Once upon a time, the United States
pharmaceutical industry was prolific in developing
new and innovative medicines. One of this paper’s
authorsrecently described the conditions that made
this model so successful over many decades.
Throughout the 1970s, most large pharma
companies had a president of research or vice
president of research and development, who
oversaw basic research (i.e., discovery). This person
was given a budget and great freedom to pursue
the science wherever it might lead. Once a discovery
was made with the potential for becoming a new
product, a development team was formed to better
define a product under the supervision of the vice
president of research and development. The
development team had representation from all
relevant disciplines, including marketing. These
teams focused on accomplishing all the steps
necessary to bring the product to market.    
As the product moved through early clinical trials
and the Food and Drug Administration process, the
delivery team developed the marketing plan for sales
teams to launch the product around the world. This
model was productive by any measure and resulted
in a steady stream of innovative products. However,
this model, for many reasons, now is failing,
resulting in a major threat to new drug innovation.3, 4
What went wrong?
In the 1970s, industry leadership began to shift
toward an emphasis on strict business practices.3
Many large pharmas began to borrow these new
business principles (e.g., management by objectives,
etc.) from non-research-intensive corporations to
manage discovery, product definition, and
development. These management tools included
rigid scrutiny and tight controls of research projects
through quarterly reviews, timelines, and Gantt
charts. However, this approach is inappropriate for
basic scientific research in the biomedical sciences.
Pharmas truly are unique research-intensive matrix
organizations, ultimate adhocracies 6, that operate
through complex collaborations between
professionals from multiple and diverse disciplines,
such as chemistry, biology, development, regulatory
affairs, patenting, marketing, information
technology, statistics, manufacturing, finance, and
many others. Furthermore, these professionals must
function in dynamic, changing, and complex
environments.  
Proper functioning of the discovery/definition/
development process requires that its management
reside within the scientific staff. However, the
increased dominance of the commercial side of
pharmas (which demanded impossible degrees of
predictability, tight controls of science and
technology, and changing “choices” of which
projects to pursue) ultimately led to a shift of control
from research to marketing and commercial
personnel. As suggested3, managing the research
and development process in this way is
counterproductive. Virtually every project is “killed”
for one reason or another along the way, often
rather arbitrarily. Thus, most pharmas essentially
have become development companies managed by
unimaginative marketing departments. Today, few
would make the argument that the current pharma
model of drug discovery and development is a
productive model for advancing innovation. Despite
billions of dollars of investment and numerous
attempts to institute systems to encourage
innovation, the current state of pharma discovery
continues to decline (Figure 1). 
The Biotech Model
Biotech began in the late 1970s when leading
scientists began to explore innovations in biology to
develop new therapeutics. The concept became a
reality with discoveries of the methods of producing
proteins through genetic engineering (recombinant
DNA) and of cloning antibodies (monoclonal
antibodies).
In the early days, investments in biotech were
made almost instinctively, based on the excitement of
potentially applying new biological methods to
produce therapeutics. Tom Perkins (founding partner
at Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers) described his
investment in Genentech Inc. as being based largely
on the enthusiasm of Bob Swanson, an excited
associate partner. Swanson proposed to start a new
venture in an entirely new industry based on the
discovery of Herb Boyer, a creative young academic
scientist at the University of California, San Francisco.
Perkins stated that after meeting with Swanson and
Boyer, he and his partner, Eugene Kleiner, decided to
fund a study to determine the feasibility of gene
splicing (to produce proteins) and, if that worked, to
fund Genentech. It did, and they did. 
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An important concurrent development was the
passage of Bayh-Dole Act by the U.S. Congress in
1980. This legislation allowed research institutes to
own the intellectual property derived from federally
funded research (e.g., National Institutes of Health
(NIH), National Science Foundation (NSF), etc.). This
accelerated the formation of biotech startups to
exploit the product definition and
development of university-derived
discoveries. Further enthusiasm for
funding biotech startups was spurred
by Genentech’s very successful initial
public offering (IPO) in 1980. 
The biotech model generally
operated when entrepreneurs and
venture capitalists organized to form a
new company (i.e., a biotech) to
pursue commercialization of a licensed
scientific discovery that arose from
publicly funded research. Much of the
initial funding was used to recruit
technical personnel and build
infrastructure (i.e., laboratories,
instrumentation, vivariums, pilot
plants, etc.) similar to those existing in
pharma, but on a smaller scale. These companies
initially focused on product definition and
development. As they advanced their lead product(s)
through development, they raised additional funds
from venture capitalists or sold equity in the
company through IPOs. As the product development
advanced into late-stage clinical trials and the
prospects of an FDA approval became realistic, most
biotechs simply did not have the more extensive
infrastructure or resources to conduct such studies
or to market the product. Thus, the
early biotechs partnered with large
pharmas to advance the potential of
their lead product(s). This model
became known as copartnering. 
The goal of transitioning into an
independent, fully integrated pharma
rarely was achieved and copartnering
with—or acquisition by—pharmas
became the prevalent outcome.
During the past twenty-five years,
the biotech model produced a number
of successful products and companies.
However, the evolution of biotech has
been so drastic that, as described
below, the existing model has become
ineffective and anachronistic in modern
times. More than half a trillion dollars have been
invested in the biotech model over the past twenty-
five years and, as detailed by Pisano, the overall
return on investment has been negative.7
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Figure 1: 
R&D Expenditures are Increasing While 
FDA Approvals are Decreasing
Source: Burrill & Company, US Food and Drug Administration
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More than half a
trillion dollars have
been invested in
the biotech model
over the past
twenty-five years
and, as detailed by
Pisano, the overall
return on
investment has
been negative.
R&D SPENDING
2004.....................................$47.8
2005.....................................$51.8
2006.....................................$56.1
2007.....................................$58.5
2008.....................................$65.2
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What went wrong?
The very early product definition and development
success stories in biotech were nearly all based on
the recombinant DNA protein engineering and
monoclonal antibody technologies. In nearly all
cases, the potential products were genetically
engineered human proteins (some with slight
variation) of known function and role in the
pathophysiology of diseases and all had high
potential for medical utility. The major challenge
(other than intellectual property) was the large-scale
production of a highly purified human protein or
antibody. Thus, the successes were known hormones
or growth factors, such as insulin, growth hormone,
interferon, tissue plasminogen activator,
erythropoietin and, later, monoclonal antibodies for
transplant rejection and cancer.  
The early successes of these products and
companies created much enthusiasm in the
investment and academic communities, which
fueled hundreds of startup biotech companies. Over
time, the general definition of biotech evolved to
include a broad scope of technologies involving
small molecules and diagnostics. The larger
profitable companies are referred to as “big
biotechs” and function similarly to pharmas. The
term “biotech” describes a small (usually a startup),
innovative company focused on a single (or limited)
biological or technology product.   
In more recent times, the technologies,
discoveries, and potential novel products have been
of a totally different nature in terms of “probability
of success” when compared with the early biotech
products. The projects have been highly innovative
and, thus, unpredictable, risky, and very likely to
involve long-term commitments. Many of the
projects focus on small molecules, not proteins or
antibodies. In effect, the research and development
projects have become similar to those with which
pharma deals. However, the small biotechs only can
tackle one project (or a few) at a time and within
limited time horizons. The venture capitalists and
investors do not have the resources or patience for
these longer time horizons and the inevitable
setbacks and delays. Pharma, on the other hand,
has, in principle, the capabilities and resources
[although currently not the right organizational
procedures or willingness 3] to handle many of
these kinds of long-term projects simultaneously, to
pursue most things that look viable, and to re-work
research when they experience impediments or
delays. Virtually every major successful product has
been afflicted with serious problems or setbacks
during development.3 The biotech model simply
does not allow for such difficulties.
Today, even the most promising discoveries made
in research institutes are seen by venture capitalists
as being too early and too risky for investing.
Considerable efforts must be expended in analytical
and upscale chemistry, safety pharmacology,
toxicology, formulations, metabolism, and many
other disciplines (preclinical development) before a
specific candidate can be deemed ready to proceed
to human testing or to pharma licensing. Therefore,
today’s venture capitalists prefer to invest in
technologies possessing well-identified lead
compounds with high probabilities of success that
are not far from entering clinical testing.
Unfortunately, such opportunities almost never exist.
A New Model for
“Distributed Partnering”
in the 21st Century
The future of financing life science innovations will
require new, more efficient, sustainable models than
those of the current pharma and biotech models.2, 4
We propose a new model that involves the
concerted collaboration of multiple and varied
organizational partners. Here, the economic and
technical risks along the discovery and development
paths are distributed and shared by independent
partners that contribute differing but
complementary expertise, culture, and value in a
sequential process. The distributed partnering model
includes four distinct, independent spheres that
collaborate in a risk-adjusted manner to discover,
define, develop, and deliver innovative products.
Discovery research 
As suggested by one of this paper’s authors and
recently documented by Block and Keller1, federal
and state research funding have become the primary
sources for discovery research. Fortunately, in the
United States, the importance of funding such
research through federal agencies, such as the NIH,
NSF, and Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency, now is accepted policy. In addition, many
initiatives also are rising at the state level. For
example, beginning in 2000, California was the first
state to fund basic discovery research with the
establishment of four publicly and privately financed
institutes at the University of California and the
A  N e w  M o d e l  f o r  “ D i s t r i b u t e d  P a r t n e r i n g ” i n  t h e  2 1 s t  C e n t u r y
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Governor Gray Davis Institutes for Science and
Innovation. This investment was followed by voter
approval of Proposition 71 in 2004, a $3 billion
effort led by Robert Klein to establish the California
Institute for Regenerative Medicine to fund stem cell
research. Currently, more than a dozen states are
investing in biomedical innovation and
infrastructure. 
Numerous departments and centers of
translational medicine and drug discovery now exist
throughout the country. The nonprofit research
community has responded with enthusiasm and
energy. The seeds for the future exploitation of
scientific advances for drug discovery already have
been planted and the existing culture in academic
settings is perfect for this type of work3, although
the funding will have to be expanded
significantly.
Once a grant has been awarded in a
given area of research, the recipient
essentially is free to pursue the science
regardless of where it leads, unlike the
pharma and biotech models. The
“management” of the science by
nontechnical managers and the
administrative formalities are both
minimal. Instead, the scientists are in
charge. Oversight occurs primarily, as
it should, through peer review and the
granting agency. This culture cannot
be duplicated in pharma or biotech.
The unrestricted pursuit of basic
science is essential to discovering the
knowledge that can be the basis for
new product innovation.
Academic laboratories, successful in making
potential new drug discoveries, eventually are faced
with technical and financial problems similar to
those in biotechs when proceeding to the next
stages of development, as described under “What
went wrong?” NIH translational grants have helped,
but their scope is too limited, too focused, and
these grants rarely have extended to advance
preclinical development needs. As described, venture
capitalists simply will not fund this kind of early
stage work. Academic laboratories have limited
access to the funds or lack the expertise needed to
do the advanced research and the early product
definition required to move the project further. In
addition, most academic researchers do not have the
experience, temperament, or even interest in
undertaking most of this work. Unfortunately,
pharmas, like biotechs, usually are not a reasonable
option for handing off the work. They rarely are
interested in pursuing these early discoveries in the
absence of greater product definition. As a result,
these potentially important early stage scientific
discoveries are stifled by the absence of viable
mechanisms for advancement. 
Definition research 
Several approaches have been attempted to
address a means of providing product definition and
early development work (i.e., definition research) for
innovative academic discoveries. A recent report
from the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation
described two academic models that have been
successful in advancing early stage discoveries, the
Deshpande Center for Technological
Innovation at the MIT School of
Engineering and the William J. von
Liebig Center at the University of
California San Diego Jacobs School of
Engineering.5 Other approaches to
fund early stage discoveries have been
tried. They include incubators,
accelerators, and virtual companies,
most of which have the primary goal
of starting new companies that face
the same challenges and funding risks
described above in the “What went
wrong?” biotech model. 
Similar opportunity needs for
definition research also occur
frequently in small biotechs. Here,
potentially important discoveries are
abandoned because the biotech’s limited resources
must be focused on clinical-stage or other advanced
programs. Even in pharma, important discoveries are
abandoned when they are not in sync with the
current strategic plan. To fulfill these unmet needs
for early product definition, we propose a new type
of innovation organization called a product
definition company (PDC). 
The PDC combines an experienced management
team with investment capital to advance a portfolio
of discoveries through the product definition stage.
An ideal example of a PDC would be one involving a
small team of professionals highly experienced in
areas, such as pharmaceutical research, clinical
sciences, regulatory affairs, operations, and
marketing. Some of these individuals would have
extensive contacts and knowledge of universities’
early therapeutic discoveries for potential
The PDC combines
an experienced
management team
with investment
capital to advance 
a portfolio of
discoveries 
through the
product definition
stage.
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acquisition. The combination of expert personnel,
specific possible projects, and the unique business
model for the PDC would be the basis for raising
sufficient initial capital to launch the operation.
Much of the work could be done on a virtual basis,
contracting the development tasks to Professional
Service Providers (PSP) to perform the key tasks
rather than building new infrastructure. The use of
ad hoc scientific experts and consultants would be
standard practice. 
The PDC business model focuses on identifying
and licensing promising discoveries from research
institutes (and biotech/pharma). Licensees would
receive traditional up-front fees, milestones,
royalties, and equity ownership. The PDC then
would progress by undertaking (via PSPs) and
supervising the required product
definition research for the acquired
projects. The ultimate intention would
be to sell the risk-reduced “asset
packages” to third parties for further
product development and delivery.
Acquirers would include venture
capitalists, pharmas, and big biotechs.
The venture capitalists most likely
would continue to fund advanced
product development in a virtual
mode, using PSPs rather than starting
new biotech companies as in the
previous model. 
Typically, a PDC might invest
between $2 million and $10 million in a given
project, depending on the cost required to achieve
proof of relevancy8 for any given discovery within an
average of three years. Proof of relevancy would be
defined on a case-by-case basis when third parties
judge progress to be sufficiently attractive for
acquisition. Given the early stage nature of most
discoveries under initial study, frequent technical
failures during definition research would be
expected; many would probably occur early and,
thus, be less costly. Even product definition failures
could create value through generation of valuable
intellectual property. 
The PDC would require initial investment funds
sufficient to address multiple projects (i.e., ~ $50
million to $100 million). Depending on the funding
and investment model selected, PDCs could be
either private or public companies. Potential
investors would include high net-worth individuals,
hedge funds, strategic partners (including
pharma/big biotech, PSPs, etc.) and venture
capitalists. The investment basis would value the
expertise of the management team and its ability to
evaluate and secure appropriate discoveries and
translate them into potential products. The return on
successful projects could range from two times to
ten times that of invested funds upon completion of
adequate definition research, making this a
potentially profitable model. (See appendix A). 
PDCs certainly would locate in regions that have
significant concentrations of biomedical research
institutions, such as San Diego, the San Francisco
Bay area, and Boston, but they also could locate
near state universities and private institutes with
major research efforts and funding. PDCs in these
regions could assist in advancing a culture that is
compatible with commercializing innovation. In the
recently published book, Start-Up
Nation, Dan Senor and Saul Singer
describe Israel’s remarkable success in
technology innovation. They suggest
the creation of an innovative culture is
key to success on commercializing
technology.9
Today, there are a multitude of
excellent PSPs that can perform the
required technical work, as well as or
better than biotechs and pharmas, at
greater efficiency and lower cost.
Furthermore, many of these PSPs are
so large, versatile, and experienced
that they could tackle several different
aspects of the same project. Plus, all of the technical
and development work for the PDC projects would
be supervised and coordinated by experienced
project managers. 
Importantly, with the PSPs doing the development,
technology transfer would occur in real-time as the
knowledge would reside in the entities performing
the work. Thus, these technologies or products
could be even more valuable to those potentially
interested in acquiring the asset in the future. In the
pharma and biotech models, the data for advancing
a technology/product come primarily from the
company’s assets (e.g., personnel, equipment, and
facilities), which are expensive and inefficient. Today,
the data could come from anywhere in the world,
and the costs are only for the required technical
work. Lastly, many other PDC functions can be
performed on a virtual basis today, reducing
unnecessary and expensive infrastructure and
increasing organizational nimbleness and flexibility. 
The PDC business
model focuses 
on identifying and
licensing promising
discoveries 
from research
institutes (and
biotech/pharma).
C o n c l u s i o n
The Distributed Partnering Model for Drug Discovery and Development 7
Development 
To complete the “development” of a new
product, delivery to the market still would require a
number of additional tasks before marketing
approval could be sought. Additional tasks include
formulation and dosage-form development,
advanced clinical trials, upscale chemistry, long-term
toxicology, manufacturing technologies, and
complex regulatory submissions, among other
requirements. Venture capitalists could fund these
activities either by forming a biotech, as in the
existing model, or by operating in a virtual mode by
use of PSPs as described above. For example, a
venture capitalist may choose to fund advanced
clinical trials (i.e., phase 2b, which is broadly
described in the industry as proof of concept) before
selling the asset to pharma or big biotech for final
product development. Specialty funding companies,
such as Symphony Capital, also could acquire PDC
assets10 and would develop them in a manner similar
to the venture capitalists. Alternatively, pharma and
big biotech would acquire the PDC asset at this
stage and, in a similar approach, fund the PSP to the
proof of concept stage.
Delivery 
Subsequently, among the activities required are
marketing, manufacturing final product, distribution
and sales, reimbursement arrangements, education
of medical and health professionals, consumers
(patients) and payers (insurance companies and
government agencies), formulary registrations,
global registrations, and post-marketing monitoring
for safety and efficacy. These tasks already are
conducted effectively and managed by pharmas and
big biotechs. In fact, these tasks are the areas in
which these corporations possess their greatest
strengths.3, 4 The proposed model assumes that these
types of companies would acquire the potential new
products arising from PDCs and introduce the
products into their delivery pipelines.
Conclusion
The proposed new distributed partnering model
offers the potential for a more productive and
efficient advancement of innovation and will be
applicable in any region with excellent research; it
does not require legions of experienced
entrepreneurs or local established venture capitalist
firms to enact. The United States is well represented
in each of the disciplines and cultures required in the
model:
• Discovery research (federal, state, and
philanthropic funding) 
• Product definition and early development 
(large number of PSPs, vast industry experience,
and entrepreneurial spirit)
• Advanced product development and delivery
(extensive infrastructure, venture capitalists
investment funds, and some of the best
pharmas and big biotechs in the world) 
This model focuses on advancing “products” as
opposed to “companies” (i.e., we need thousands
of products not thousands of companies). By
combining the expertise of these distinct cultures
and organizations, innovative products could be
advanced efficiently, making the risks and
investments more proportional to—and rational
for—each partner. If successful, the United States
might continue, and even accelerate, its global
dominance in innovative medical products. 
Finally, while this manuscript discusses the
innovative biomedical sector of innovation, the
model may well apply to other innovation sectors,
including high-tech, information technology,
cleantech, etc. As this early phase of innovation
investment is crucial to the U.S. economy and to
addressing the nation’s most important challenges
(e.g., higher quality, affordable healthcare; a cleaner
environment; better security, etc.), the federal
government should consider a follow-on matching
investment to PDC private sector investors. The
private sector limited partners would set the terms
and conditions with the federal government serving
as an additional limited-partner investor. The federal
investment covenants would be that the investments
be the first funding after seed, grants, etc. (i.e., pre-
venture) in the technology and that a high
percentage of the investments (~80 percent) be
made in intellectual property technology that has a
foundation in federal- or state-funded research
project grants. 
These investments will serve to grow our economy
by immediately creating jobs in the crucial
innovation economy sector. Furthermore, while
investors may do well, society will be the greatest
beneficiary in terms of better health care, a cleaner
environment, a more plentiful food supply, better
communications, and a safer world.
A p p e n d i x  A
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Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7
Capital Related
GP $ 167 $ 167 $ 167 $ - $ - $ - $ -
Outside LPs 49,500 - - - - - -
Total Capital Related $ 49,667 $ 167 $ 167 $ - $ - $ - $ -
Fund Performance
LP Capital Invested $ (14,500) $ (14,500) $ (14,500) $ - $ - $ - $ -
LP Capital Returned - - - 8,250 16,500 16,500 8,250
LP Profit - - - 8,425 22,185 22,185 13,761
Total Capital Returned/ $ (14,500) $ (14,500) $ (14,500) $ 16, 675 $ 38,685 $ 38,685 $ 22,011
(Invested)
Management Fees (2,000) (2,000) (2,000) (2,000) (2,000) (400) (400)
GP Incentive Fees (1,685) (4,437) (4,437) (2,752)
Institution Incentive Fees (1,264) (3,328) (3,328) (2,064)
Total Fees $ (2,000) $ (2,000) $ (2,000) $ (4,949) $ (9,765) $ (8,165) $ (5,216)
Total Cash Inflow/(Outflow) $ (16,500) $ (16,500) $ (16,500) $ 11,726 $ 28,921 $ 30,521 $ 16,794
IRR 17%
Cash Inflow $ 38,462
Multiple of Capital Invested 1.8x
Accelerator Fund 1 (LP Economics at 32 percent return)
($ in thousands)
Appendix A
The table below depicts potential Limited Partner economics for illustrative purposes. Actual results may vary.
Assumptions
• Assumes that all funds are raised in Year 1.
• Management fee is reduced by 80 percent of the original amount (i.e., by $1.6 million) beginning with the first
fiscal quarter commencing six years from the initial closing, and continuing each year for the balance of the
fund's term. 
• Assumes total fund is invested in all investee companies by the end of Year 3 and dollars are invested ratably
over the three-year investment period. 
• Assumes that investments will be exited as a percentage of the aggregate as follows: 16.67 percent in Year 4,
33.3 percent in Year 5, 33.3 percent in Year 6, and 16.67 percent in Year 7.
• Compensation to fund employees assumes competitive market rates.
• Assumes fund makes twelve investments and realizes a gross IRR of 32 percent.
• GP incentive fees realized as carried interest equal to 20 percent.
• Institution incentive fees realized as carried interest equal to 15 percent.
R e f e r e n c e s
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The table below illustrates the support for the fund gross IRR assumption of 32 percent.
Accelerator Fund 1 (Assumptions for Gross IRR)
10.0x 1 0.7x 1/1/2010 (16,500) 32%
7.5x 1 0.5X 1/1/2011 (16,500)
5.0x 2 0.7x 1/1/2012 (16,500)
3.0x 2 0.4x 1/1/2013 21,725
2.0x 2 0.3x 1/1/2014 43,450
1.0x 2 0.1x 1/1/2015 43,450
0.0x 5 0.0x 1/1/2016 21,725
15 2.6x
Multiple
Number of Portfolio
Companies Exited at
Multiple
Gross
Blended
Return Years
Invested/
Returned
Gross 
IRR
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